The main problem when approaching this topic, but in general when dealing with issues of global justice, is maintaining an impartial stance. Defining terrorism by excluding any moral judgment from the reasoning would result in a complete, impartial, but also delicate argument. To do this, a political philosopher must keep in mind the concepts of "value neutrality", "value freedom" and "value independence". Professor Carter clearly highlighted the difference between the concepts in his work entitled “Value Absence and Value Neutrality in the Analysis of Political Concepts”. “Freedom of values” concerns the place (or rather the absence) of evaluative terms in the definition of a concept, while neutrality of values ​​implies a suspension of judgment on the comparative merits of divergent ethical positions. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay Each of these two characteristics is a methodological desideratum in the case of certain concepts in certain theoretical contexts. Sometimes it is appropriate to take an empirical approach to analyze and define a concept, which requires a value-free definition. Sometimes it is appropriate to take a noncommittal approach to ethics, which requires a certain degree of value neutrality. The two approaches can be combined, but, as we will see, they can also be dissociated. Furthermore, it is useful to distinguish between valuelessness and value-neutrality, on the one hand, and complete detachment of our analysis from any ethical concerns, on the other. This latter idea can be called “value independence.” One may have ethical reasons to adopt an empirical approach in the analysis and definition of a given concept. And one may have ethical reasons to adopt a noncommittal approach to a given set of ethical positions. Thus, neither the absence of values ​​nor the neutrality of values ​​should be motivated by the desire to detach one's analysis from all ethical concerns. Value independence may imply value absence and value neutrality, but the reverse is certainly not the case. Value neutrality is considered useful because it provides us with a common starting point from which to express genuine ethical disagreements. Valuelessness means that a concept is valueless if its definition is such that the definiens contains no evaluative terms. Rather, “value neutrality” occurs when the use of a concept does not imply the superiority of any one of a set of contrasting substantive ethical viewpoints. Unlike valuelessness, value neutrality is a matter of degree, because value neutrality always exists with respect to a particular range of substantive ethical views, and this range can vary in magnitude. A concept is value-independent if its definition can be justified only in terms of theoretical and explanatory considerations, and not at all in terms of ethical considerations. To say that a given political concept is independent of values ​​is to say that, even if it can take on evaluative meanings in everyday political discourse, it can nevertheless be defined simply with the aim of improving our understanding of empirical phenomena and without presuppose or refer to any of these evaluative meanings. Value independence is easily confused with valuelessness and value neutrality..