In utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill advances the "greatest happiness principle", according to which "actions are right to the extent that they tend to produce happiness… [and] by happiness is intended pleasure and absence of pain. [1] Mill supplements the "greatest happiness principle" with the argument in Chapter II that certain types of higher pleasures are intrinsically of greater value than others, because competent judges prefer them even if accompanied of a lesser degree of pleasure. It is, however, difficult to defend the anti-hedonistic principle of higher pleasures as the central doctrine of Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism. Given that hedonism regards a pleasure of a finite quantity as equal to another pleasure of the same finite quantity, it seems that qualitative distinctions between pleasures cannot be reconciled without importing principles based on values ​​foreign to the traditional hedonism. This conflict is further complicated by the implications of Mill's conclusions about virtue. Mill argues in Chapter IV that virtue has no higher intrinsic value, despite its privileged status – it is simply an instrument of happiness. It quickly becomes apparent that the higher pleasures of Chapter II are no different from the virtue of Chapter IV: the higher pleasures are intrinsically more valuable, whereas the value of virtue lies solely in its preference. In Chapter IV, Mill provides a new framework for his preference-based utilitarianism—based on a dichotomy between will and desire—that offers a means of attempting to reconcile the inconsistent implications of Mill's conclusions in Chapters II and IV. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that Mill's theory of utilitarianism cannot be sustained, as the distinction between will and desire proves to be an insufficient antidote to the internal contradictions of his preference-based utilitarianism. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay In Chapter II, Mill outlines his view of preference-based utilitarianism. It is possible to distinguish two interpretations of this form of utilitarianism: the first claims that it is the satisfaction of our preferences that has value, and the second claims that it is the objects of our preferences that have value. In Chapter II, Mill clearly aligns himself with the second form of hedonistic utilitarianism. Mill's argument in Chapter II seeks to answer an essential phenomenological question: is an object valuable because we prefer it, or do we prefer an object because it is valuable? Mill argues for the latter solution: the intrinsic value of the object precedes preference, and a competent judge's preference for one object of pleasure over another indicates a higher intrinsic value in that object. Note that this argument largely depends on the jurisdiction of the judge. Mill develops the following argument in Chapter II to justify his initial position on preference-based utilitarianism: Argument from Preference for Pleasure A) "Of two pleasures, if there be one, to which almost all who have experience of both give a decisive preference, regardless of any moral obligation to prefer it, it is the most desirable [and most valuable] pleasure” (9) “Those who equally know and are capable. to appreciate and appreciate both give a marked preference to the mode of existence which employs their higher faculties” (9).C) Therefore, pleasures which employ the higher faculties are more desirable and more valuable Assuming that. those who are equally familiar with both types ofpleasure in premise B act independently of any moral obligation to prefer it (a requirement of premise A), and the judges are competent and knowledgeable about both pleasures, the argument is deductively valid. Mill's argument can even be defended against the objection that a desired object is not desirable in itself – Mill's use of "desirable" necessarily means desired, but this conclusion cannot follow from the fact that the object is desired . However, Mill would probably respond that "competent judges" will always succeed in identifying the more valuable pleasure and that, therefore, for these prudent judges, the object of higher value will always be desired. Therefore, Mill might argue that the pleasures of the higher faculties, always preferred by competent judges, are necessarily desired – or desirable – at least for competent judges. Because a full investigation into the conditions necessary to be a competent judge is well beyond the scope of this article, Mill's argument will be accepted. Furthermore, Mill states that the higher value of preferred pleasure is clearer in cases where they prefer an object of pleasure "even though they know that it is accompanied by a greater amount of discontent" (9) or less pleasure. If this is the case – and if judges are truly competent and not mistaken in their preferences – then Mill's argument is valid. Mill then distinguishes between satisfaction and happiness, demonstrating that pleasure and happiness are not necessarily the same. Mill argues that “it is better to be a dissatisfied human being than a satisfied pig; Better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. (10). It is worth noting here that Mill is not saying that it is better to be an unhappy Socrates than a happy fool – happiness and satisfaction are not synonymous. Mill is incredibly clear: “Whoever supposes that this preference [for the pleasure of the higher faculties] occurs at the cost of a sacrifice of happiness – that the higher being in nearly equal circumstances is not happier than the lower – confuses the two very different ideas. of happiness and content” (9). And again, Mill asserts that the satisfaction of higher pleasures brings a greater amount of happiness, even when accompanied by “a greater amount of discontent” (9) or a lesser amount of pleasure. Therefore, it becomes clear that while satisfaction/contentment is obviously not synonymous with happiness, pleasure is also not the same as happiness. However, this appears to conflict with Mill's earlier definition of the "greatest happiness principle", in which he states that "happiness is the pleasure sought" (7). The only conceivable solution to this contradiction is this: even if pleasure is the only constituent of happiness (according to Mill's previous assertion), not all pleasures contribute equally to happiness: the pleasures of the higher faculties contribute more to happiness than the lower pleasures. Mill's hierarchy of evaluation of pleasures, however, becomes more difficult to defend once he turns to the concept of virtue in Chapter IV. In this chapter, Mill arrives at conclusions regarding the relationships between pleasure, desire, and happiness that seem to directly contradict the implications of Chapter II. Mill's utilitarianism “holds not only that virtue must be desired, but that it must be desired disinterestedly, for its own sake” (36). However, Mill explains that this is simply a psychological phenomenon: an individual may originally desire an object (virtue) as a means of pleasure, but as he becomes more and more accustomed to this mode of behavior, he may stop looking beyond this object. ofhis initially instrumental preference. This object then becomes a final preference, pursued as an end in itself. Mill is clear that virtue does not acquire a higher degree of value through this normative phenomenon, but is nonetheless more desired. Mill even connects the instrumental desire for virtue with a miser's desire for wealth, for both are mere means to happiness that merge with ends in themselves. Ultimately, Mill concludes that virtue becomes a part of happiness, because it is pursued as an end and yet happiness arises from it. A person who desires virtue “is made happy, or thinks he would be, by the mere possession of it; and was made unhappy by the failure to obtain it” (38). And Mill argues that preferences give more value to these favored “sources of pleasure” (38). Thus, while Mill argued in Chapter II that the pleasures of the higher faculties are of intrinsically greater value than the lower pleasures, Mill argues in Chapter IV that the value of virtue lies primarily in the desire for and preference for it. To explain the psychological phenomenon surrounding the status of virtue as a part of happiness, it is obvious that “to think of an object as desirable (except for its consequences) and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing” (39). However, in Chapter II, Mill demonstrated that competent judges desire the higher pleasures that will bring them the most happiness, even when accompanied by less pleasure or more pain. Mill's previous argument in Chapter II was based on the claim that not all pleasures contribute equally to happiness, and therefore the "competent judge" will desire those objects of pleasure which contribute most to happiness. Based on Mill's previous argument, if an individual simply desires those objects that are most pleasurable (as Mill argues in Chapter IV), then he can only achieve the lower pleasures of sensual objects and will only achieve never happiness. Mill would characterize this individual as a “satisfied fool” in Chapter II, as opposed to the dissatisfied Socrates who always possesses more happiness than the fool. It seems that Mill's position in Chapter II cannot be sustained in light of Mill's later assertion that the desirable is the same as the pleasant. At the end of Chapter IV, however, Mill provides an explanation for this apparent contradiction and offers a new framework within which to reevaluate higher pleasures in Chapter II and virtue in Chapter IV: "the will is something other than desire" ( 39). Mill continues to explain that will is an active phenomenon and differs from the passive sensitivity of the desire for pleasure. Mill explains that the will “can, in time, take root and break away from the parental stock” (40), and that through simple habit an individual can desire an object simply because he wants it. This may explain how virtue can be desired for its own sake, even when accompanied by less pleasure, and may also explain the phenomenon whereby higher pleasures are preferred, and even desired, although they provide a degree less pleasure than that offered by lower pleasures. , Mill specifies that “the will, at the outset, is produced entirely by desire” (40). Therefore, the will of the competent judge towards the pleasures of the higher faculties of Chapter II must be preceded by the desire for these faculties. Given Mill's assertion in Chapter IV that we desire only what is pleasant, it becomes necessary that at some time in the past the pleasures of the higher faculties were accompanied by a greater degree of pleasure than were not the sensual pleasures. 7