Heidegger's metaphysics in Being and Time delegates the problem of reality to a problem much more important for him, and therefore supra-important for reality: the problem of the question of meaning of Being in general. However, the problem of reality, considered within the framework of his method for finding the answer to his metaphysical problem, is not a problem at all; nor should it be considered as such, according to Heidegger. The answer to the philosophical problem of reality, whether things exist or not, whether we can prove them or not, becomes a concrete non-problem. It is through Heidegger's treatment of Being, and consequently that of human understanding of one's own Being, that the problem of reality demonstrates that it has no basis on which to constitute a problem; that is, there is a reality and it does not need to be proven. This is Heidegger’s method of answering the question “what is being?” (49) which serves as a fundamental focal point for his claims about the being of humans and entities in the world. He undertakes the task of answering the “fundamental question of philosophy” as a “phenomenological” inquiry, which involves “how” we should “accept the things themselves,” the things examined (50). Clearly, for Heidegger, it is an investigation which allows “to see from oneself what is shown in the very way in which it shows itself from oneself” (58). Man, or what he designates in an “appropriate” way for metaphysical investigation, “Dasein”, as this entity which “in its very being, this being is for him an issue”, becomes for Heidegger the key of the response. of “what is being?” » (32). Indeed, Dasein's understanding of Being comes to be the metaphysical milieu of the article ......lly (by us, Dasein, obviously) Heidegger's exposition in which, through the Dasein's revealing access to the Real (entities), Reality (kind of being) can be understood by Dasein in the problem it poses of being in general. Reality does not need to be proven, it already "is" as long as Dasein "is", and the Real has no basis on which to be proven if Dasein "is" not there to reveal it in the first place; whether or not this can be proven in this case cannot be said. Heidegger does not claim, however, that we should consider these problems, because we are ultimately Dasein, this very entity, and "if Dasein is rightly understood, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it is already what later things "the evidence judges necessary to demonstrate" (249). Works Cited Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. New York: Harper, 1962. Print.