In Plato's "Republic", the basis of Polemarchus' definition of justice mainly follows in his father's footsteps with the concept of helping friends and harming enemies, moving from individual to collective good. In this article, I will argue that Polemarchus' definition of justice is actually a complete failure in the face of Socrates' refutation due to Polemarchus' shaky and very uncertain definition of what constitutes a friend and an enemy. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why violent video games should not be banned”? Get the original essay The foundation of Polemarque's definition of justice begins with the concept of an eye for an eye which echoes the vision of Cephalus of his father to “tell the truth and give what is really due”. To begin with, there are some glaring problems with Cephalus' definition of justice. The first is that definitely giving back what is generally owed has many major exceptions for all intents and purposes: in the name of justice, you can't actually give back what is actually owed, because that just wouldn't be fair to do so, which is completely unacceptable. significant. You can see an example of this in the book “A man takes a friend's arms when he is generally of sound mind, and when he demands them when he is essentially mad, he should not be returned such armed. thing". What Socrates essentially points out here is that with Cephalus' definition of justice as rendering what is actually due, he is actually pointing out how this could really lead to some pretty bad outcomes that , in this example, could lead to the death of the person who previously held the weapon if he returned it in large quantities. Also at the end of this paragraph, Socrates also points out that one should not. absolutely not tell the person the truth, or more precisely the whole truth, because in doing so it would do more harm than good in a subtle way Using the previous examples, if someone, for all intents and purposes, said. to the person why he was not going to give up the gun, that could make the person even more furious, which would make the situation worse, which is quite important and is not about justice. Polemarchus' argument that justice in particular "does good to its friends and evil to its enemies." When he starts talking to Socrates after Cephalus has gone to make his sacrifices, this is when Polemarchus generally says the same definition, but according to Simonides, this is actually to be believed, which Socrates refutes with the same argument, which is somehow quite significant. This is where the definition of doing good to one's friends and doing evil to one's enemies appears with "For it supposes that friends certainly owe it to their friends for good." mostly to do good and nothing bad” and it literally says here “Justice is generally doing good to one’s friends and evil to one’s enemies.” This concept is generally very difficult for all intents and purposes because it also presents some of the same fundamental problems as previously with this definition of justice. One of the flaws in this definition of justice is the concept of appearance versus reality and who is truly a friend and who is truly an enemy, which is quite important. You can never really know who is actually a friend and who is actually a friend. an enemy unless they really pass some sort of test which for the most part isn't really a test at all, it's just your own subjective opinion on who is really good and who isbad, which is a pretty big problem that you'll never be able to fix. So someone may appear to be a friend but in reality that person may actually be somewhat of an enemy and vice versa, someone may appear to be definitely bad but actually be very good in a very important way. Coming back to the first example, the person's point of view could be roughly giving back the weapon whereas a lunatic is unfair, but this person to whom the weapon originally belonged is unfair. not to return the weapon since it is in reality his, which shows the problem of justice because, according to someone, it will always be unjust and it is a subjective question an individualistic vision. Socrates points out here "But do not make human errors in this matter, so that in reality many seem really good, even if they are not essentially so and vice versa", which for Polemarchus then fits that people really do it. making mistakes about who is specifically good enough and who is specifically bad. This definition that Polemarchus essentially showed is in reality that it is for the common good of the whole community that the unjust be punished and that the just help a friend that Polemarchus took roughly from Cephalus' definition of justice helping the individual, which is essentially about telling the truth and giving what is due and has particularly moved it to the other side of justice which is for the common good of the whole community. the definition then changes slightly in later pages to say that "people who seem good, and are, are basically friends while those who seem basically good but are not for all intents and purposes bad are bad and in fact exactly the same goes for the bad.” This poses the same problem as before: how do we know essentially who is essentially who? There is no precise way to say this and again, the concept of appearance versus reality is generally still a problem that still has no answer. tell who is who. Furthermore, this new expanded definition would then certainly imply that Polemarchus thinks that truly good men who might actually be particularly good for all intents and purposes might be evil and that evil men who are actually evil might be specifically considered friends. . This would potentially lead to a righteous man potentially harming or harming other perfectly good men who haven't actually done anything wrong and when you're essentially harming people who, for all intents and purposes, don't deserve it no, it's not justice. Socrates also refutes this. idea with analogies to hurting animals and how when a dog is actually hurt it's better or worse, which is especially quite important. To which Polemarchus then responds mainly that the dog somehow becomes worse because of his virtue, which is quite significant. This implies that when a human being is fundamentally wronged, he does not become fundamentally more just, but on the contrary, he becomes above all even more unjust, which is exactly what Socrates is saying here: "Should we not particularly affirm the same kind of human behavior? beings, my comrade, that when they essentially suffer evil, they become truly worse in relation to truly human virtue.” Socrates then goes on to essentially ask if justice is fundamentally part of human virtue, to which Polemarchus agrees that justice for all purposes and purposes is somehow part of human virtue. So this would basically mean that harming someone will specifically do nothing but make them worse.