Economic inequality has been a major topic of discussion in recent years, in academic circles, policy circles, and the popular press. Kulkarni and Matin-Bekat (2009) suggest that inequality applied to income inequality and economic inequality is a very complex issue; Economists, sociologists, and political scientists are just some of the people concerned about economic inequality. What is discussed and above all the greatest concern is the ever-increasing gap between the rich and the poor, which can potentially have serious political consequences in many countries around the world. These consequences include how economic inequality undermines democratic governments and how, as economic inequality increases, democratic support declines among the population. This article will discuss three major policy consequences associated with economic inequality: negative political consequences, public dissatisfaction with the democratic process, and redistributive preferences and, at the same time, this article will incorporate empirical evidence by comparing inequality economic in two countries: Brazil and the South. Africa.Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Economic equality can be described as differences in economic distribution within a particular population in terms of wealth, wages, and income. Basically, the rich get richer and richer, while the poor keep getting poorer. A person's economic position in society can be determined by a wide range of factors, including: education, gender, ethnicity, existing economic policies or physical disability. The unequal distribution of wealth and income widens the gap between the rich and the poor, leading to income disparities between individuals and households. Political economy theory suggests that democracy is a mechanism for redistributing resources from economic elites to poor citizens and that citizens will therefore desire democracy more strongly in a country with greater economic inequality. However, as economic inequality increases, democratic support declines. Dahl argues that democracy's failure to address persistent economic inequality leads to "resentments and frustrations that weaken allegiance to the regime." As cited in Krieckhaus (2013), Karl argues that economic inequality has vitiated popular control over Latin American government; “The economic elites have bent the laws to their orders, weakened the courts, violated rights, corrupted politicians and flouted constitutions and contracts.” High inequality has also led the masses to withdraw their support for democratic governance in Brazil. This is evidenced by the fact that Brazil has had a long period of socialist leaders, from the 1980s to the present. Cordova and Seligson (2010) provide quantitative evidence that income inequality reduces democratic support in Latin America and the Caribbean. Krieckhaus (2013) argues that citizens living in countries with higher national economic inequality will report less support for democracy than citizens living in countries with lower national economic inequality. Economic inequality has led to political polarization within political parties. Political polarization occurs when differences existideological conflicts between the general public, political parties and politicians, leading to political conflict. It also means the division of a nation, with two completely different political perspectives that cause constant tension among the population. For example, Souza and Medeiros (2015) argue that low-income people could vote homogeneously as a form of protest against existing economic inequalities. Economic inequality poses a threat to democratic success and stability in Brazil and South Africa. Citizens must support democracy for it to thrive and this cannot happen when economic opportunities and resources are unevenly distributed. The win-lose gap must be as small as possible for citizens to support democracy. Additionally, economic inequality encourages redistributive preferences among citizens. The poor tend to have greater support for redistribution than the rich. As Giliomee suggests, Brazil and South Africa's progress toward democracy occurred as compromises between rival elites unable to impose their will unilaterally. In two countries, the new structures called "new democracies" by Weffort cited in Giliomee involve the mixing of democratic institutions with those of a recent authoritarian past. The key question on both continents is whether the actors in these “hybrid situations” will view these compromises with the past as a potential handicap for democracy or as a potential strength. Finally, socio-economic inequalities between the richest 10 percent and the poorest 50 percent are approximately the same level in South Africa and Brazil. The failure of attempts to significantly improve extreme poverty and reduce inequality seriously jeopardizes democratic consolidation. As cited in Giliomee, Weffort argues that it is not possible to consolidate a political democracy if there is a contradiction between an institutional system based on the political equality of citizens and a society characterized by extreme inequalities or a process of growing social and economic inequalities. Brazil and South Africa are still considered among the most unequal countries in the world when it comes to economic inequality. The difference between what the "upper class" earns in these countries is simply absurd compared to what a "lower class" can earn in salary, if employed. Although both countries have developed some of the world's most ambitious social policies over the years, the issue does not appear to be changing. This situation appears to be closely linked to corruption rates in these countries. Plans on paper may be sustainable, but in reality they are completely utopian due to poor management of resources and regulations. According to reports from Freedom House in Brazil, people do not have equal opportunities and are not safe from economic exploitation. Slave working conditions pose a significant problem in rural and increasingly urban areas. A constitutional amendment in 2012 allows the government to confiscate all property of landowners who use forced labor. However, under President Temer, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security announced in October 2017 that it would not continue to automatically make its “dirty list” public. employers who subject workers to abusive conditions. The ministry also changed its internal definition of “slave conditions” to a more limited set of conditions.,.