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Essay / The Virtue of True Friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics
Friendship is arguably the most relevant philosophical topic expounded in the Nicomachean Ethics. Although other virtues are not practiced on a daily basis, friendship and the implications of such a relationship are a bit more consistent. Living requires interactions and relationships with other people, and Aristotle's view of friendship offers insight that can be integrated into everyday life. Aristotle uses his discussion of friendship and its relationship to justice to create a basis for his argument about the function of politics, the “science of the human good,” in society (Aristotle, I, 2, 3). In light of his philosophical dissection of friendship and justice, Aristotle would support a government with a philosopher king as head of the polis – as presented by Plato – although Aristotle's political system would focus more on promoting individual virtue than on the creation of a perfect system. Company. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay The virtue of true friendship, as defined by Aristotle, deals with the mutually reciprocal relationship between two good people who demonstrate good will towards each other for the love of others (VIII, 2, 144). Although Aristotle's definition seems intuitive, a relationship must meet many conditions to be considered a true friendship. Above all, friendship must be virtuous. Virtue, specifically moral virtue, is a “state of character concerned with choice… this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (II, 6, 31) . People perform virtuous actions for the sake of action, aiming for happiness – the “final and self-sufficient end… of action” – and not using them as a means to obtain something else (I, 7, 10). Virtue also predisposes an individual to perform virtuous actions “at the right time, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive and in the right manner” (II, 6, 30). Friendship, which is based on mutual love, is a virtue because “mutual love implies a choice and the choice springs from a state of character” (VIII, 5, 148). Therefore, if a man considers himself a friend to another, then that man must make a conscious decision to participate in activities of friendship toward the other person. Friendship therefore cultivates the actions of true friendship in the desire to fulfill the human telos, or final goal of human life. It is for this reason that useful and pleasant friendships are not virtuous and dissolve quickly, because they exist so that each party can gain something from the other. True friendship, however, stands the test of time as long as friends interact regularly. In the case of friendship, both parties love each other unconditionally, constantly, equally and for the other's sake. The differences between friendship and other traditional virtues can be clearly seen when considering friendship and temperance. Temperance is the golden mean between indulgence and insensitivity, excessive and deficient states of character, while true friendship is the extreme in one sense (III, 10, 55). True friendship does not lie on a continuum, but encompasses the lower types of friendship, that of utility and pleasure. Therefore, true friendship is both pleasant and useful, but these complementary qualities do not constitute the foundation of the relationship (VIII, 4, 147). The virtue of temperance, on the other hand, is neither lenient nor insensitive, because these vices are opposite states of character. Furthermore, temperance does not requireof interaction with others, while friendship presupposes social interaction. A person can be considered temperate if they work on their character state, but a person cannot establish friendship alone. It seems, then, that friendship resembles the virtue of justice more than any of the other virtues in form and function. Friendship and justice require a social context. There can be neither friendship nor justice with one person. Moreover, neither justice nor friendship can be shown to an unsuspecting object or person; there must be a mutual recognition of justice or friendship between those involved, otherwise the virtue manifested is only good will. Friendship, like justice, is a virtue for the virtuous, because it requires individuals to have virtue within themselves before they can apply it to others. But friendship, by definition, includes justice, “the very exercise of complete virtue” (V, 1, 81). True friends, who love each other unconditionally for the sake of the other, “have no need of justice…and the truest form of justice is considered a friendly quality” (VIII, 1, 142). For this reason, the legislator aims to build friendships within the polis, because when friendship is established, justice undoubtedly accompanies it. Justice is directly linked to friendship, and the two virtues “have equal extension” (VIII, 9, 153). The truer the friendship, the more justice is expected from the relationship. This is why governments strive to foster the truest friendships in order to fully maintain justice. Friendships exist between father and son, husband and wife, or brother and brother, but the manifestation of friendships and the actions performed by each couple differ depending on the nature of the relationship. Just as different relationships of friendship are formed, so too are different constitutions of effective government formed. Effective government appropriates justice “in each case according to merit, because this also applies to friendship” (VIII, 11, 156). Among effective governments, there are three constitutions: monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy, each reflecting one of the friendly relations. Monarchy is the type of government in which a king rules over his subjects. This king “is self-sufficient and surpasses his subjects in all good things”, which makes him virtuous (VIII, 10, 154). His virtue and independence allow him to fully look after the interests of his subjects, and because of his virtue, the subjects completely trust and honor him. Monarchy is linked to the friendship between father and son, in which the father is “responsible for the existence of his children… for their upbringing and upbringing” (VIII, 11, 155). Through monarchy, citizens grow in virtue and wisdom according to the king's guidance, and the king in turn receives honor and glory from his subjects. The perversion of this constitution is tyranny, in which the tyrant rules over his subjects according to his own interests and mirrors the relationship between master and slave. In this relationship, “there is nothing in common between the two parties; the slave is a living tool”, and friendship – as well as justice – must be mutually recognized (VIII, 11, 156). In a tyrannical political system, as in the master-slave relationship, there is neither justice nor friendship, because one cannot be friends with a tool. For this reason, Aristotle considers tyranny as “the worst form of deviation” and monarchy, the opposite of tyranny, as the best constitution (VIII, 10, 154). In an aristocracy, a group of qualified nobles govern “in accordance with their values.” .” The aristocratic form of government closely resembles the relationship between husband and wife, as the husband governs "in matters in which aA man should govern, but he entrusts to him the affairs that are suitable for a woman” (VIII, 10, 155). The aristocracy thus shares powers with the general public, each working for the success of the polis. Aristocracy degrades into oligarchy when wealth and power, instead of virtue, determine the law. People who do not deserve authority are exalted, leading to the destruction of a functioning political system. For this reason, the degree of justice found in an oligarchy is reduced, just as pure friendship between husband and wife can be reduced to useful friendship. A timocratic government is the political form in which the owners govern "in turn and on an equal footing." Equality and equity determine the laws in this type of government, which arise from the fact that the rulers are “similar in their feelings and in their character” (VIII, 11, 156). Timocracy reflects the friendship formed between brothers, because "two things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common education and similarity of age", which help brothers develop similar beliefs and values (VIII, 12, 157). The distortion of timocracy is democracy, in which all have an equal share of the ruling power. Although legislation is not always based on virtue, democratic government is the least distorted version of friendship and justice, because "where citizens are equal, they have much in common" (VIII, 11 , 156). government and their corresponding forms of friendship, Aristotle would consider the philosopher king to be the ideal head of government. In The Republic, Plato explains what he considers to be the purest and most effective form of government: a monarchy with a philosopher king – constantly seeking truth and filled with virtue and phronesis, or practical wisdom – who determines the laws and gives them to guardians to implement and enforce (Plato, V, 473d, 153). Under Plato's regime, the guardians are stripped of their individualism to better serve the city (VIII, 543a-c, 221). All citizens, except the philosopher king, would be raised to believe the noble lie, a lie intended to direct people toward virtuous action (III, 414a-415a, 94). For this type of government to begin, children would be taken from their parents, raised with a curriculum to foster wisdom and virtue, and a new city would be established with the children (VII, 541a, 220). Although Aristotle – from his discussions of justice and friendship – agreed with the philosopher king as a monarch, he would have a very different approach to the founding of such a political system. Aristotle believes that monarchy establishes the truest form of justice, because it parallels "the friendship of children toward their parents and of men toward the gods." The god-man relationship represents a true father-son friendship, because the gods “are the causes of their being and their nourishment, and of their education from their birth” (Aristotle, VIII, 12, 158). Friendship between gods and men is the purest form of friendship, because the gods are “blessed and happy among all beings” (X, 8, 197). Because the gods embody happiness, they are also the most virtuous and the most contemplative. Fittingly, the king would be a philosopher, a man whose life is equally oriented toward the contemplative and virtue. The king, who has the greatest sense of virtue and justice, helps his subjects grow in virtue from the creation of the city. Subjects, based on their love and respect for the king, respect his laws, which serve to promote virtuous actions and discourage vice. Because virtue develops from habitual action, laws will eventually make the city's citizens virtuous. Aristotle does not.