Nietzsche's Assault on Modern Morality: The Kamehameha Connection complex. of morality in just three short words. Nietzsche saw the morality of his own social context as a disease inherited from several generations. In his 1884 work The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche traces the roots of morality and thus explains the origin of its pathogen. In this essay, I will first explain Nietzsche's critique of morality and explain the alternative he offers to the modern system. Second, I will evaluate author Alasdair MacIntyre's claim that Nietzsche's denunciation of contemporary moral beliefs closely parallels the abolition of kapu, or taboo, by the Hawaiian King Kamehameha II in 1819. I will conclude with The claim that Nietzsche's argument is valid because it recognizes the fundamental nature of morality. Unlike the “taboo morality” of Enlightenment thinkers, Nietzsche recognizes that morality – although based on a concept – is spontaneous and irrational. For this reason, MacIntyre's connection between Nietzsche and Kamehameha II is not only brilliant, but also well-founded. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Nietzsche's Critique of Morality Nietzsche not only thought that the morality of his respective society was defective or misguided. He thought it was sick. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche states that his civilization inherited an acute illness from previous generations. The goal of his “genealogy,” in essence, is to carefully trace the pathogen affecting his world – and thus to denounce the Enlightenment project. In the introductory sections of his first essay, Nietzsche launches an attack on “English psychologists,” such as the utilitarian John Stuart Mill, who, he believes, have hidden their eyes from moral truth. Nietzsche states that "these analysts... have specifically trained themselves to sacrifice what is desirable for what is true, all truth in fact, even the simple, bitter, ugly, loathsome, unchristian, and immoral truths - for there are truths of this description. » (10) He severely criticizes the psychologists of his time because they are not moral historians. They think the concept of "good" was developed by those who possessed such goodness, he says, but in reality it arose from a culture of self-affirming aristocrats. Nietzsche identifies the fault of these thinkers in order to found his own argument. “The whole of their thinking follows, as has always been the case with philosophers of the old fashion, totally antihistorical lines” (10), he says before launching into a complex genealogical critique of morality. Nietzsche begins his history lesson in the period stretching from Homeric Greece to the 8th century BC. At that time, the concept of good was exclusively invented by the aristocracy. For the most powerful members of society, "good" was simply a term asserted to describe the very traits that they and they alone possessed: physical strength, nobility, wealth, etc. The “good” judgment does not come from those to whom kindness has been shown. Rather, it was the good people themselves, that is to say the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-ranking, the noble-minded, who felt that they themselves were good and that their actions were good. , that is to say good people. first order, as opposed to all the base, the low-minded, the vulgar and the plebeians. (11) As a secondary definitionand complementary, "bad" was attributed to individuals who did not express the traits of the aristocracy and was used to define the characteristics of the lower classes. Nietzsche says that "the fundamental instinct of a superior dominant race associating itself with an inferior race, a "sub-race", such is the origin of the antithesis of good and evil. (11) On the basis of this distinction, Nietzsche argues that the origin of “good” is “far from having a necessary connection with altruistic acts.” (11) He sharply criticizes the widely held belief that the definition of “good” aligns with such profound and morally good characteristics. Instead, goodness is based on the “archaic trait,” or the concept that aristocrats believe themselves to be of a higher order than others. (13) To further support this claim, Nietzsche cites historical examples of the “archaic trait” embodied by past cultures – the Greeks meaning “the truthful” and the Goths coming from the German word “intestine” or God-like. . (13) He also explains how words with negative connotations, like "dark" and "black", most likely originated from dark-haired European peoples who were overtaken by blond-haired Aryans. As a general rule, Nietzsche concluded, political superiority necessarily implies psychological superiority. (15) The next phase of Nietzsche's genealogy concerns the usurpation of power by the priestly class, which is marked by a movement against some of the most fundamental characteristics of the old noble class. Ironically, he says, the priestly mode arose from the aristocrats but quickly made them their main moral enemy. The pure and the impure became opposites to be associated with good and evil, and the assertive morality of the aristocracy was transformed into one largely shaped by self-denial. Nietzsche denigrates this new morality and says that "humanity itself is still sick from the effects of the naivety of this priestly healing." (15) Despite his contempt for the priestly mode, Nietzsche nevertheless maintains that it resulted in a positive result. With this change in morality, human beings became more complex due to the introduction of the concept of "soul", something that sets man apart as "an interesting animal", he says. (16) Nietzsche attributes the modern disease of morality to its final phase. Slave morality, which emphasized the battle of good versus evil, was stimulated by Nietzsche's concept of resentment. This term goes beyond “resentment” because it refers to a suboptimal situation associated with the inability to escape it. Nietzsche says that it is resentment that drives slave morality, which is based not on love – as many tend to believe – but rather on its direct antithesis. The weakness of the slaves “causes their hatred to take a monstrous and sinister form, a most cunning and venomous form,” he says. (16) Nietzsche considers embittered slaves to be the worst enemies, especially because they are the weakest and most hateful individuals. The slave revolt over morality precedes the rise to power of the priestly class, in which the upper class is convinced to adhere to a new morality of self-sacrifice in place of the assertive one. Nietzsche says: “Slave morality says “no” from the beginning to what is “external to it”, “different from itself” and “not itself”: and this “no” is its creative act. » (19) This “radical transvaluation of values” (17) arose from the deep desire of the slave class to achieve ultimate revenge against their oppressors. “The wretched are the only good ones: the poor, the weak, the humble are the only onesgood ; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, because they alone are salvation - but you, on the contrary, you the aristocrats, you the men of power, are yours. for all eternity the wicked, the horrible, the greedy, the insatiable, the impious; eternally also you will be the unfortunate, the cursed, the damned! (17) Nietzsche contrasts the two modes of morality to better elucidate his deep disgust for the mode used by the slave class. He says that the morality of slaves – “an act of purest vengeance” (17) – was provoked by resentment, which differs greatly from that of slaves. How the assertive morality of aristocrats was originally created. “The “well-born” felt “happy”; they didn’t have to artificially manufacture their happiness by looking at their enemies,” he says. They did not need to “lie” to achieve happiness, unlike the slave classes. (20) Furthermore, the aristocratic man “lived in trust and openness with himself,” while the “resentful man” is neither sincere nor honest with himself. (21) The slave revolt conceives and manufactures the notion of a “wicked” man – although Nietzsche argues that this man should be honored – and creates in itself a “contrasting and corresponding figure”. (21) In his conclusions, Nietzsche argues that the basis of all forms of civilization is to "domesticate" man and bring him down to the level of other lower animals, and that resentment is a mere "tool of civilization.” (23-24) Furthermore, the grave harm done to the morals of the slaves goes unnoticed by the masses and has “vanished from sight” only because they “won the victory.” (17) Like other long-term processes, Nietzsche says that the modern mode is difficult to recognize. “The “redemption” of the human race is progressing wonderfully; everything obviously becomes Judaized, Christianized or popularized,” he says. (18-19) Throughout his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche is more favorable to the aristocratic point of view, although he also admits the flaws of such a position. He is clearly more critical of the slave's morality because, although he praises his introspective nature, he asserts that it rests on a foundation of vengeance. Nietzsche's moral ideal As an alternative to the morality that Nietzsche identifies in his own society, he proposes a new mode – a "sigh of hope" – which will manifest "a glimpse of man which justifies the existence of the 'man, a glimpse of an embodied human happiness that realizes and redeems, for which one can hold fast to belief in man!'(25) Nietzsche's plea for such morality is supplanted by his vision ruthlessness of modern culture, to the extent that we have effectively lost "the will to be man." (25) The central and most devastating problem of European society, he asserts, was endemic nihilism. Nietzsche's proposed morality is based on his desire to return to the assertive moral narrative of ancient times while retaining the somewhat accidental benefits of later slave morality – that is, the notion of culture and the complex introspective nature of human beings. Hence the challenge for Nietzsche to reconcile these two necessary elements of the morality he proposes. Nietzsche advises his contemporaries to look to their own heroes – such as brilliant poets and composers – and not to what he calls “lost men” as the model of this new morality. The way in which man must manifest himself in the world and the way in which man must act as a moral agent, he asserts, lies in the ever-important “will to power.” Nietzsche describes this phenomenon in his1886 work Beyond Good and Evil: "[Whatever] is a living and non-dying body... must be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, to propagate, to to take hold, to become predominant – not of any morality or immorality, but because it is alive and because life is simply the will to power… which is after all the will to live. (Section 259) Nietzsche lays the foundation for the theory of the will to power in his Genealogy of Morals when he distinguishes between lambs and birds of prey. It is understandable and completely natural for a lamb to perceive birds of prey as evil creatures, but he asserts that this view is neither founded nor valid. For Nietzsche, the bird's action of attacking a lamb is only an expression of its force: the act and the "author" are therefore distinct entities. It would be a mistake to distinguish the bird's strength from its ability to kill. He maintains that "the actor 'is a mere appendage of the action' and, furthermore, 'action is everything.' (26) The lamb's view of Nietzsche's contemporaries is precisely what is wrong with morality, he says. “Man has been tamed,” his greatness smothered by resentment, pity, and invalid sympathy. (31) A critic might argue that if Nietzsche attacks morality on moral grounds, his argument will be seriously weakened, if not erased. After all, if Nietzsche finds immeasurable flaws throughout the entire history of human morality, what makes the model he proposes different? Furthermore, because Nietzsche finds fault in the Enlightenment project – or in the search for the foundations of morality – a critic would say that it is hypocritical of him to form his own morality based on the "will to power." But to advance this argument is to fail to understand the entire Nietzschean project. For Nietzsche's moral foundation for humanity, the “will to power,” is ultimately not much of a foundation. The will to power is at the same time spontaneous, irrational and illogical. Unlike the moral foundations of Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard—passion, reason, and choice, respectively—Nietzsche's “non-foundation” is only a foundation insofar as it animates us all. If the will to power is indeed universal for all men, its manifestations are not. In other words, even though every man is endowed with a will to power, this will invariably manifest itself in different ways in different people. This is where the fundamental difference between Nietzsche and the thinkers of the Enlightenment project lies, which he refutes in his Genealogy of Morals. In After Virtue, MacIntyre says that Nietzsche wants us to become “autonomous moral subjects through a gigantic and heroic act of will.” This “new table” of morality must be built entirely from the individual. (114)MacIntyre, Nietzsche and Kamehameha II Nietzsche attacks the “taboo” morality of his own cultural context. Contemporary fashion, he asserts, seeks to rationalize the inherently irrational character of humanity's will to power. In other words, the morality of Nietzsche's time is only a vain attempt to justify the unjustifiable. Nietzsche's proposed morality is a mode that recalls an ancient morality while incorporating the positive, if accidental, benefits of the seriously flawed morality of the "slave revolt." Central to this new morality is the need to recognize and understand why morality is fundamentally irrational. In After Virtue, MacIntyre describes the strength of Nietzsche's position as dependent on "the truth of a central thesis": "[A]ll rational arguments in..

Essay / Nietzsche's Assault on Modern Morality: The Kamehameha Connection complex. of morality in just three short words. Nietzsche saw the morality of his own social context as a disease inherited from several generations. In his 1884 work The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche traces the roots of morality and thus explains the origin of its pathogen. In this essay, I will first explain Nietzsche's critique of morality and explain the alternative he offers to the modern system. Second, I will evaluate author Alasdair MacIntyre's claim that Nietzsche's denunciation of contemporary moral beliefs closely parallels the abolition of kapu, or taboo, by the Hawaiian King Kamehameha II in 1819. I will conclude with The claim that Nietzsche's argument is valid because it recognizes the fundamental nature of morality. Unlike the “taboo morality” of Enlightenment thinkers, Nietzsche recognizes that morality – although based on a concept – is spontaneous and irrational. For this reason, MacIntyre's connection between Nietzsche and Kamehameha II is not only brilliant, but also well-founded. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Nietzsche's Critique of Morality Nietzsche not only thought that the morality of his respective society was defective or misguided. He thought it was sick. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche states that his civilization inherited an acute illness from previous generations. The goal of his “genealogy,” in essence, is to carefully trace the pathogen affecting his world – and thus to denounce the Enlightenment project. In the introductory sections of his first essay, Nietzsche launches an attack on “English psychologists,” such as the utilitarian John Stuart Mill, who, he believes, have hidden their eyes from moral truth. Nietzsche states that "these analysts... have specifically trained themselves to sacrifice what is desirable for what is true, all truth in fact, even the simple, bitter, ugly, loathsome, unchristian, and immoral truths - for there are truths of this description. » (10) He severely criticizes the psychologists of his time because they are not moral historians. They think the concept of "good" was developed by those who possessed such goodness, he says, but in reality it arose from a culture of self-affirming aristocrats. Nietzsche identifies the fault of these thinkers in order to found his own argument. “The whole of their thinking follows, as has always been the case with philosophers of the old fashion, totally antihistorical lines” (10), he says before launching into a complex genealogical critique of morality. Nietzsche begins his history lesson in the period stretching from Homeric Greece to the 8th century BC. At that time, the concept of good was exclusively invented by the aristocracy. For the most powerful members of society, "good" was simply a term asserted to describe the very traits that they and they alone possessed: physical strength, nobility, wealth, etc. The “good” judgment does not come from those to whom kindness has been shown. Rather, it was the good people themselves, that is to say the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-ranking, the noble-minded, who felt that they themselves were good and that their actions were good. , that is to say good people. first order, as opposed to all the base, the low-minded, the vulgar and the plebeians. (11) As a secondary definitionand complementary, "bad" was attributed to individuals who did not express the traits of the aristocracy and was used to define the characteristics of the lower classes. Nietzsche says that "the fundamental instinct of a superior dominant race associating itself with an inferior race, a "sub-race", such is the origin of the antithesis of good and evil. (11) On the basis of this distinction, Nietzsche argues that the origin of “good” is “far from having a necessary connection with altruistic acts.” (11) He sharply criticizes the widely held belief that the definition of “good” aligns with such profound and morally good characteristics. Instead, goodness is based on the “archaic trait,” or the concept that aristocrats believe themselves to be of a higher order than others. (13) To further support this claim, Nietzsche cites historical examples of the “archaic trait” embodied by past cultures – the Greeks meaning “the truthful” and the Goths coming from the German word “intestine” or God-like. . (13) He also explains how words with negative connotations, like "dark" and "black", most likely originated from dark-haired European peoples who were overtaken by blond-haired Aryans. As a general rule, Nietzsche concluded, political superiority necessarily implies psychological superiority. (15) The next phase of Nietzsche's genealogy concerns the usurpation of power by the priestly class, which is marked by a movement against some of the most fundamental characteristics of the old noble class. Ironically, he says, the priestly mode arose from the aristocrats but quickly made them their main moral enemy. The pure and the impure became opposites to be associated with good and evil, and the assertive morality of the aristocracy was transformed into one largely shaped by self-denial. Nietzsche denigrates this new morality and says that "humanity itself is still sick from the effects of the naivety of this priestly healing." (15) Despite his contempt for the priestly mode, Nietzsche nevertheless maintains that it resulted in a positive result. With this change in morality, human beings became more complex due to the introduction of the concept of "soul", something that sets man apart as "an interesting animal", he says. (16) Nietzsche attributes the modern disease of morality to its final phase. Slave morality, which emphasized the battle of good versus evil, was stimulated by Nietzsche's concept of resentment. This term goes beyond “resentment” because it refers to a suboptimal situation associated with the inability to escape it. Nietzsche says that it is resentment that drives slave morality, which is based not on love – as many tend to believe – but rather on its direct antithesis. The weakness of the slaves “causes their hatred to take a monstrous and sinister form, a most cunning and venomous form,” he says. (16) Nietzsche considers embittered slaves to be the worst enemies, especially because they are the weakest and most hateful individuals. The slave revolt over morality precedes the rise to power of the priestly class, in which the upper class is convinced to adhere to a new morality of self-sacrifice in place of the assertive one. Nietzsche says: “Slave morality says “no” from the beginning to what is “external to it”, “different from itself” and “not itself”: and this “no” is its creative act. » (19) This “radical transvaluation of values” (17) arose from the deep desire of the slave class to achieve ultimate revenge against their oppressors. “The wretched are the only good ones: the poor, the weak, the humble are the only onesgood ; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, because they alone are salvation - but you, on the contrary, you the aristocrats, you the men of power, are yours. for all eternity the wicked, the horrible, the greedy, the insatiable, the impious; eternally also you will be the unfortunate, the cursed, the damned! (17) Nietzsche contrasts the two modes of morality to better elucidate his deep disgust for the mode used by the slave class. He says that the morality of slaves – “an act of purest vengeance” (17) – was provoked by resentment, which differs greatly from that of slaves. How the assertive morality of aristocrats was originally created. “The “well-born” felt “happy”; they didn’t have to artificially manufacture their happiness by looking at their enemies,” he says. They did not need to “lie” to achieve happiness, unlike the slave classes. (20) Furthermore, the aristocratic man “lived in trust and openness with himself,” while the “resentful man” is neither sincere nor honest with himself. (21) The slave revolt conceives and manufactures the notion of a “wicked” man – although Nietzsche argues that this man should be honored – and creates in itself a “contrasting and corresponding figure”. (21) In his conclusions, Nietzsche argues that the basis of all forms of civilization is to "domesticate" man and bring him down to the level of other lower animals, and that resentment is a mere "tool of civilization.” (23-24) Furthermore, the grave harm done to the morals of the slaves goes unnoticed by the masses and has “vanished from sight” only because they “won the victory.” (17) Like other long-term processes, Nietzsche says that the modern mode is difficult to recognize. “The “redemption” of the human race is progressing wonderfully; everything obviously becomes Judaized, Christianized or popularized,” he says. (18-19) Throughout his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche is more favorable to the aristocratic point of view, although he also admits the flaws of such a position. He is clearly more critical of the slave's morality because, although he praises his introspective nature, he asserts that it rests on a foundation of vengeance. Nietzsche's moral ideal As an alternative to the morality that Nietzsche identifies in his own society, he proposes a new mode – a "sigh of hope" – which will manifest "a glimpse of man which justifies the existence of the 'man, a glimpse of an embodied human happiness that realizes and redeems, for which one can hold fast to belief in man!'(25) Nietzsche's plea for such morality is supplanted by his vision ruthlessness of modern culture, to the extent that we have effectively lost "the will to be man." (25) The central and most devastating problem of European society, he asserts, was endemic nihilism. Nietzsche's proposed morality is based on his desire to return to the assertive moral narrative of ancient times while retaining the somewhat accidental benefits of later slave morality – that is, the notion of culture and the complex introspective nature of human beings. Hence the challenge for Nietzsche to reconcile these two necessary elements of the morality he proposes. Nietzsche advises his contemporaries to look to their own heroes – such as brilliant poets and composers – and not to what he calls “lost men” as the model of this new morality. The way in which man must manifest himself in the world and the way in which man must act as a moral agent, he asserts, lies in the ever-important “will to power.” Nietzsche describes this phenomenon in his1886 work Beyond Good and Evil: "[Whatever] is a living and non-dying body... must be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, to propagate, to to take hold, to become predominant – not of any morality or immorality, but because it is alive and because life is simply the will to power… which is after all the will to live. (Section 259) Nietzsche lays the foundation for the theory of the will to power in his Genealogy of Morals when he distinguishes between lambs and birds of prey. It is understandable and completely natural for a lamb to perceive birds of prey as evil creatures, but he asserts that this view is neither founded nor valid. For Nietzsche, the bird's action of attacking a lamb is only an expression of its force: the act and the "author" are therefore distinct entities. It would be a mistake to distinguish the bird's strength from its ability to kill. He maintains that "the actor 'is a mere appendage of the action' and, furthermore, 'action is everything.' (26) The lamb's view of Nietzsche's contemporaries is precisely what is wrong with morality, he says. “Man has been tamed,” his greatness smothered by resentment, pity, and invalid sympathy. (31) A critic might argue that if Nietzsche attacks morality on moral grounds, his argument will be seriously weakened, if not erased. After all, if Nietzsche finds immeasurable flaws throughout the entire history of human morality, what makes the model he proposes different? Furthermore, because Nietzsche finds fault in the Enlightenment project – or in the search for the foundations of morality – a critic would say that it is hypocritical of him to form his own morality based on the "will to power." But to advance this argument is to fail to understand the entire Nietzschean project. For Nietzsche's moral foundation for humanity, the “will to power,” is ultimately not much of a foundation. The will to power is at the same time spontaneous, irrational and illogical. Unlike the moral foundations of Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard—passion, reason, and choice, respectively—Nietzsche's “non-foundation” is only a foundation insofar as it animates us all. If the will to power is indeed universal for all men, its manifestations are not. In other words, even though every man is endowed with a will to power, this will invariably manifest itself in different ways in different people. This is where the fundamental difference between Nietzsche and the thinkers of the Enlightenment project lies, which he refutes in his Genealogy of Morals. In After Virtue, MacIntyre says that Nietzsche wants us to become “autonomous moral subjects through a gigantic and heroic act of will.” This “new table” of morality must be built entirely from the individual. (114)MacIntyre, Nietzsche and Kamehameha II Nietzsche attacks the “taboo” morality of his own cultural context. Contemporary fashion, he asserts, seeks to rationalize the inherently irrational character of humanity's will to power. In other words, the morality of Nietzsche's time is only a vain attempt to justify the unjustifiable. Nietzsche's proposed morality is a mode that recalls an ancient morality while incorporating the positive, if accidental, benefits of the seriously flawed morality of the "slave revolt." Central to this new morality is the need to recognize and understand why morality is fundamentally irrational. In After Virtue, MacIntyre describes the strength of Nietzsche's position as dependent on "the truth of a central thesis": "[A]ll rational arguments in..

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