In “A New Look at the Prime Mover,” Bradshaw argues that Aristotle's immovable, immaterial, and necessary mover is not only a final cause but also a efficient cause. He proposes to demonstrate this by applying a particular interpretation of divine thought as the key to understanding Aristotle's seemingly vague comments regarding the causal role of the prime mover. This article will address some of Bradshaw's objections to the standard view that the prime mover is the final cause. Drawing on a passage linking prime mover activity and motion, Bradshaw presents his first objection to the standard view by arguing that this demonstrates efficient prime mover causation. The connection between prime mover activity and movement can be explained by Metaphysics 1072b1-3 in which the prime mover moves the prime sky as the object of desire. In the first part of his fourth objection, Bradshaw takes the words "infinite power" to mean efficient causation. However, the point of the argument is to demonstrate the lack of greatness of the prime mover and not the power of the prime mover. Additionally, terminology such as horsepower implies horsepower that is not that of the prime mover. Bradshaw's final objection to evaluate, the second part of the fourth objection, is that the army analogy indicates efficient causation. Bradshaw is wrong here because he takes the analogy beyond Aristotle's intention which is to demonstrate the relationship of goodness between the prime mover and the world and not to say that the prime mover is the organizing principle of the world. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned"?Get the original essay Bradshaw's first set of objections to the standard reading of the prime mover as a final, non-efficient cause is that first, Aristotle does not does not specify that the prime mover is not an efficient cause (as is the immobile mover in Physics), and secondly, certain passages seem to indicate efficient rather than final causation. In response to the first problem, Bradshaw admits that there are many cases in which Aristotle changes his mind without comment. He will write that despite this fact, the language of Metaphysics XII.6 is "most naturally interpreted as referring to an efficient cause." In support of this assertion, Bradshaw refers to 1071b17. “For if it is not active, there will be no movement.” Bradshaw explains that this passage is part of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonists' lack of explanation of the source of motion. Bradshaw takes the “that” to indicate the prime mover and interprets the necessity of prime mover activity for movement as an indication of effective causation. If the Prime Mover is not active, in other words, if the first mover is not active (for the first mover is its activity), then there would be no movement, specifically of the first heaven. However, Aristotle carefully explains how the prime mover moves the prime heaven. That for the sake of which can exist among immovable things is brought out by a distinction. For the for-who-is both for someone for whom and that towards which, and of these the latter is immovable and the former is not. And it produces movement to the extent that it is loved, and by thus moving something, it moves the rest. In this passage, Aristotle explains that "why", simply the final cause, can be distinguished in two ways. The first, “one for whom,” seems to refer to someone who can inspire another to do something for themselves. This final cause is mobile, whichimplies the capacity to change and is therefore unnecessary, at least as far as space is concerned. The second, a “that towards which”, is more like a magnet which by its nature attracts another body towards itself. Kibble attracts a dog in this way by being desirable because of what it is and because of what the dog is. Aristotle concludes that it is in this way that the main mover moves towards the first heaven. “So this is what the sky and nature depend on.” As a result, the passage Bradshaw refers to does not clearly indicate or lend itself naturally to efficient causation, nor to a reading of it as final cause. In fact, Aristotle clearly explains how the prime mover, as the final cause, moves the first heaven. The first part of Bradshaw's fourth objection is that Aristotle's argument regarding the infinite power of the prime mover requires it to be an efficient cause. “Since the Mover has infinite power, it cannot have greatness. This clearly requires the Mover to be an efficient cause, for a final cause need not possess any power at all.” The argument Bradshaw refers to comes at the end of Metaphysics XII.7 and focuses on the question of the magnitude of the prime mover. It has also been shown that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but must be partless and indivisible. Because it moves something for an unlimited time, and nothing finite has unlimited capacity. And, since all magnitude is either unlimited or finite, it cannot have finite magnitude…and it cannot have unlimited magnitude because there is no unlimited magnitude at all. The main purpose of this argument is to demonstrate that the prime mover lacks magnitude, not that the prime mover has "infinite power" or "unlimited capacity." Aristotle's argument is not that the prime mover moves the first sky and therefore must have unlimited capacity. It is rather that nothing finite has unlimited capacity and that the prime mover, since it eternally moves the first sky, cannot be finite. Certainly, this passage implies that the main engine has unlimited capacity. One must be wary of the implications of power in the word "capacity", for it is obvious that the prime mover, being a pure reality, has no power of its own. Bradshaw recognizes a serious difficulty in his use of this passage. He does not mean that the prime mover is "an efficient cause in a simpler and more ordinary sense... for this implies that the mover exercises a power which can be quantified and which is comparable (although vastly superior) to that exercised by physical bodies. ". He goes on to say that if one took this to its extreme logical conclusion, he would infer that the prime mover exerts some sort of physical force on the first sky. He rejects this conclusion because of its obvious inconsistency with the rest of Aristotle's account of the prime mover. Although Bradshaw rejects such a physical conception of prime mover causation, it indicates a problem that could be avoided if one viewed the argument as concerning the lack of magnitude of the prime mover and not as implying that the prime mover moves in a certain way (as an effective agent) other than Aristotle explains it in the Metaphysics. The second part of the fourth objection is an argument for efficient prime mover causality, based on the analogy of an army. This argument fails because Bradshaw takes the analogy to mean more than the author intended. Bradshaw states that "the Mover acts directly and intentionally on the cosmos to produce order, just as a general act on his army." He draws this conclusion based on 14, 2020.