Table of ContentsSummaryMission Command: Operation AnacondaBuilding cohesive teams through mutual trustCreating shared understandingProviding clear commander intentExercising disciplined initiativeUsing mission ordersAccepting prudent risksConclusionWorks CitedSummaryThis persuasive essay conducts an analysis of mission command during “Operation Anaconda,” a military operation conducted in the Shahikot Valley in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom. This operation follows the Battle of Tora Bora which led to the partial defeat and flight of Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces across the Pakistani border due to the lack of coalition blocking forces. Operation Anaconda demonstrates how the principles of mission command are interconnected and directly linked to battlefield operations. Operation Anaconda also highlighted the fractured nature of mission command principles when their acceptance and execution are not fully implemented. The subsequent successes and failures of this operation and the principles of mission command associated with it set the stage for all future engagements in the war in Afghanistan. Say no to plagiarism. Get a custom essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”?Get the original essayMission Command: Operation AnacondaThe Department of the Army's Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines the mission command as "the Army's approach to command." and control that allows subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution adapted to the situation.” Mission command in the U.S. Army is based on six principles: building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating common understanding, providing clear commander intent, demonstrating disciplined initiative, using mission orders, and accepting prudent risks, all of which enable commanders and their staffs to initiate military battle plans with clear guidance and direction. Commanders and their staffs employ mission command to maneuver forces and shape operations according to "commander's intent" guided by the mission, enemy, terrain, available troops, and civilian considerations (MET- TC). Military operations are implemented through the mission command philosophy, executed by war troops, and enabled by military lines of effort. The failure of the six principles of mission command during Operation Anaconda forever altered the way the United States wages war while creating enormous challenges that our forces still face. the Lion of Panjshir, the Northern Alliance of Ahmad Shah Masoud. The Northern Alliance was made up of battle-hardened Turkmen, Uzbek, and Afghan militias who honed their combat prowess during 20 years of war against the Soviet Union. However, during Operation Anaconda, local militia troops were not associated with the Northern Alliance, but rather with Zia Lodin's "Eastern Alliance". To create a cohesive team, American forces rushed to develop mutual trust, disregarding cultural norms. Eventually, Lodin's forces withdrew unexpectedly, leaving American infantry troops alone and vulnerable on the eastern slopes of the Shahikot Valley. Strengthening mutual trust would have made it possible to build a more cohesive team composed of American soldiers and Pashtun militias. This fully developed scenario would have provided moreof adherence to the essential role of the Pashtuns in the mission, as a “hammer” in the hammer and anvil operation. Creating a Shared Understanding The end state of shared understanding is that all stakeholders maintain a common understanding of the battlespace and its operational environment, including its problems, alternative courses of action and solutions inherent to the way forward. A deeply shared understanding during Operation Anaconda was that between Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), U.S. Army Lt. Gen. (LTG) Paul Mikolashek, Coalition Lt. Gen. ( LTG) Michael Moseley of the U.S. Air Force Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) and the U.S. Army Afghanistan tactical commander, Maj. Gen. (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck. CFLCC and CFACC and their attached commands were stationed in the Persian Gulf while MG Hagnebeck and its units were on the ground in Afghanistan. The common understanding of the operation was understood by all American commanders, although its fruits were not borne during the battle, primarily due to the splintered command structure. Provide clear intent from the commander. “Operation Anaconda sought to eliminate the enemy in this area of ​​the valley and in these hills. said Gen. (GEN) Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). This intention was clearly communicated by GEN Franks to component and tactical commanders, wherever they were stationed. Although this divided command structure is made up of varied units, all of which played a role in the ultimate success or failure of the operation. For example, ground operations commanders could not approve airstrikes or direct certain special operations units and non-military entities such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). While General Franks was able to provide clear intentions to commanders, the broken command structure inhibited commanders' decision-making. Exercise-disciplined initiative “Exercise-disciplined initiative” is “action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise” according to the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0. American troops demonstrated disciplined initiative by being versatile, agile and flexible. They also demonstrated great disciplined initiative as their original battle plans were abandoned and replaced with different patterns of fire and maneuver, such as U.S. forces engaging in both the "hammer and dagger" role. 'anvil'. Thanks to these changes, American forces were able to overcome unforeseen obstacles and emerge relatively victorious. Using Mission Orders Mission orders guide the use and employment of equipment, resources, tasks, missions, and personnel. During Operation Anaconda, indirect fire weapons, combat helicopters and armored fire support platforms such as infantry fighting vehicles or cavalry fighting vehicles for support of the The infantry were not sufficiently allocated to the operation. These deficiencies were based on erroneous intelligence and the lack of properly coordinated air assets. Commanders quickly realized the dire circumstances of their situation and began initiating contingency plans and alternative plans of action (COAs), such as immediately replacing damaged Apache gunships and resorting to fuel , ammunition and 2002..