In this thesis, I will carry out the analysis of the theory of ideal fulfillment of desire and of objective list theory to conclude that the latter is more plausible as a theory of well-being. In doing so, I will clarify key theories, draw out the objections facing both, and determine whether these objections are valid before concluding. Before discussing the different theories, it will be helpful to start with the clarifications and definitions of key concepts. The three traditional theories of well-being are divided into two categories: either a subjective necessity, an individual having a favorable attitude towards the good, or an objective necessity, a given thing is good only if it demonstrates substantial (independent) value attitude). According to the simplest form of desire fulfillment theory, well-being is achieved through the satisfaction of desires in terms of psychological state (subjective necessity). Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay In this article, the theory of ideal desire fulfillment will be analyzed instead. The theory states that well-being is the satisfaction of desires formed under ideal conditions, not actual desires. Ideal conditions include all relevant true information, free from bias, emotional stability and moral excellence. Peter Railton states that "the good of an individual consists in what he would want or pursue if he viewed his present situation from a point of view that is fully and keenly informed about himself and his situation, and entirely free cognitive errors or lapses of conscience. instrumental rationality. Richard Brand argues and proposes that rational desires are those that have survived "cognitive psychotherapy" where desires have been criticized and corrected by facts and logic, provided one is fully informed. A standard characterization can then be stated as follows: "X is intrinsically good for person A because, ideally informed, A would want a 'non-ideal' A to have well-being. “Therefore, objections related to uninformed desires and inauthentic preferences should not apply when the “ideal” self makes choices for the real, non-ideal self. Yet objections to this still arise from (1) the disbelief that all base, malicious, inauthentic, adaptive desires completely disappear under ideal conditions, (2) whether these ideal desires will benefit the (non-ideal) individual and finally, (3) Euthyphro. worry. Before discussing the plausibility of this theory, let's discuss objective list theory. Objective list theory holds that well-being is high when it contains the plurality of basic goods that are objectively valuable. These objective goods do not require subjective attraction to have intrinsic value for an individual's well-being (objective necessity). Basic goods such as romantic relationships, knowledge, health, accomplishment, and pleasures can be included in goal lists. The standard characterization of objective list theory may be: "X is intrinsically good for person A because it is objectively valuable, and possession of X allows A to have better well-being." "Now this raises the question of which theory is more plausible than the other. The first objective of this article is to argue against the objections to an objective theory ofwell-being before proceeding to analyze the plausibility of the theory of ideal realization of desire. The appeal of objective list theory is that goods of all kinds, independent of attitude, contribute to a person's well-being, even if they are not desired. One of the strengths of objective list theory is individuals' considered judgments in which they evaluate these goods without viewing them as mere examples of desire fulfillments or means to an end. It emphasizes that life is richer or fuller in every way if one is engaged in these basic goods because these goods benefit them. For example, if a person lacks the fundamental desire to have relationships through cognitive and informed analysis, ideal desire fulfillment claims that a relationship will not contribute to one's well-being. The idea that an individual's life will be better because of romantic relationships is implausible. Romantic relationships benefit individuals because they involve reciprocal love that constitutes well-being even without the presence of desire. Idealists could respond to my argument in several ways. They could bring the concept of approval constraint and alienation objection. They protest that objective list theories wrongly imply that something is a constituent of well-being even if the individual lacks a positive attitude toward it. For example. Railton asserts that "it would be an intolerable and alienated conception of anyone's good to imagine that it could somehow fail to engage him." Fletcher also supports a list claiming that having a pro-attitude is a necessary component. If a person lives well according to the list of goals but fails to satisfy the approval constraint, he or she will be unhappy. This notion can be supported by the idea of ​​autonomy and the feeling of individuality. Sumner believes that it is up to an individual to determine how well they have fared in the past. Well-being should focus on an individual and their own attitudes and beliefs, rather than on the well-being of a person as a category to which they belong (a human being). This emphasizes that well-being is a personal value that reflects the fact that what is safe or wrong for an individual must be positively or negatively related to their own psychology. In other words, it is important to embrace a form of prudential internalism because everyone should have some power to determine what constitutes their own well-being and to confer prudential value on the things they care about. Although I recognize that each individual is unique, the rival's response is nevertheless weakened by Brad Hooker's counterargument. It accepts that the acquisition of valuable goods always contributes to a person's well-being, even if those goods have not been sought, experienced, or rejected. Supposed person A gains important wisdom that is not part of A's goals and at present A does not appreciate the value of wisdom because A did not desire wisdom until very late in life. When this wisdom is valued, A might think that her life is better than she thought. It may be a proposition that an individual might be in a better situation than they thought, due to some unrecognized good in their life. This proposition is always plausible without depending on the individual's ability to accept it. Suppose A dies without considering such a proposition, the proposition could still be true. And if this is true, the subjective necessity of a good might not be a necessary condition. However, it must be recognized that goodsGoals, even if not desire, may constitute some well-being, but if felt, they will also lead to a decrease in well-being. The overall balance of the contribution will depend on the importance, nature of the relationship and the distress caused to the individual. According to Hooker's claim, subjective necessity and objective necessity are individually sufficient for a good to constitute well-being. Thus, the approval constraint, according to which nothing constitutes an objective achievement unless subjectively asserted, is weakened. Idealists caution that the objective list is based on several unsystematic intuitions because it has difficulty predicting the intuitions that determine which goods are of prudential value. Relying on intuitions can confirm erroneous or biased views of well-being. Sumner counters that there is no logical guarantee that the "more developed" person will fare better than their undeveloped peers or that any option is more likely to make a greater contribution to happiness. However, it must be recognized that non-systematic intuitions are predominant in various philosophical theories and that this objection is therefore weak. Having argued for a list of goals, I will now discuss the plausibility of the theory of ideal desire fulfillment and its appeal. The ideal theory of desire fulfillment may be more attractive to rivals because it embraces the internalism that characterizes the goods intrinsic to individuals' desires and avoids alienation. However, I will now present how it is implausible that perfect information would reduce (1) all base, malicious, inauthentic, and adaptive desires. First, true information can always lead to false beliefs. Loeb gives an example of how a subject with all the information about current science can nevertheless lead to reasonable but false conclusions. Another possibility would be that an individual with all the information could treat it as irrelevant information or with irrelevant information being treated instead. Intuition therefore amounts to linking an individual's notion of good to their intellectual abilities ultimately. It is assumed that the individual's cognitive abilities are unique to make this claim. Finally, framing biases may affect the impact on full information views. Railton himself notes that differences in order of presentation will have different impacts, but argues that differential effects will be minimized with increasing information. Furthermore, under ideal conditions, an individual will be aware of their susceptibility, which will further diminish the difference in impact. This response is weak because there is evidence for the stubbornness of beliefs and even Railton agrees that individuals' beliefs are often resistant to change. This “perseverance in beliefs” further undermines the appeal of internalism. At this point we can also consider the point of view of well-informed desires and perfect reasoning, one will realize that the enhancement of desires is not affected or changed by information due to the motivational nature of the the individual himself. We know that there are individuals whose desires are either base or malicious. Idealizers assume that through idealization the process also eliminates the desire for goods that are not “good to have.” This contradicts subjective necessity since it requires that there be goods of well-being independent of desire. Even if idealizers counter with the “bite the bullet” argument, by intuition the average person.