In Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle examines happiness, which is the good towards which all human action is directed. Within this quest is Aristotle's discussion of ideas such as virtue, magnanimity, justice, and friendship, and the relationships between all of these. However, before he can address these relationships, Aristotle must dissect each of the ideas so that they can exist outside of simple relationship to others. This done, he can then build on each of them: from virtue, Aristotle builds up to magnanimity; from magnanimity he builds justice; and from justice he builds friendship. I will therefore adopt a similar approach in this essay, which aims to condense these relationships, and to identify recurring themes, notably that of equality. As he nears the end of his text, Aristotle also begins to discuss the political implications of his work, which originated in the pursuit of what was "the highest good." These implications therefore constitute an important and illuminating application of Aristotle's ideas, and I will therefore similarly conclude with an analysis of these implications. But, as Aristotle does, I must start with the elementary blockage which is the common quest of all humans, namely happiness. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”?Get the original essayAristotle, which is addressed to “competent students of what is right and just”, or in other words to those who “have received an appropriate education in moral conduct”, is therefore addressing a different audience from what Plato does in The Republic (Ostwald, 7). He can thus launch directly into his discussion of happiness, which he likens to people who “always or to the highest degree do and contemplate that which is consistent with virtue” (25). Aristotle then defines the virtues as a middle ground between excess and deficit in each case, later stating that humans must apply their unique function of rationality and reason to settle on this middle ground. So, for example, the golden mean between narrow-mindedness and vanity is magnanimity or greatness of mind. Virtue, which is divided into intellectual virtues and moral virtues, can then be realized by a virtuous man who acts consciously, chooses the specific way in which he acts, and chooses that action for its own sake, making his action a "just and righteous" action. just ". controlled" (39). In his discussion of virtue, Aristotle identifies multiple means that exist between excesses. However, the main virtue, and the one that essentially relies on the other virtues discussed, is magnanimity, or nobility of spirit Like magnificence, magnanimity operates on a grand, even grand scale: but while magnificence eclipses meager generosity, magnanimity eclipses small honors. honor and dishonor that a man of nobility has the right attitude", in fact, "he considers himself worthy of honor above all else" (94). because he is the greatest, and “nobility of spirit is thus like the crowning of virtues: it magnifies them and cannot exist without them” (95). with regard to the other virtues, it is its relationship to nobility, which “is common to all the virtues” (90). As Aristotle writes, it is impossible to have true nobility “without goodness and nobility” (95). Thus, nobility is what allows the magnanimous to embody all the virtues and to rely on them. Building then on his discussion of the virtues, and in particular "nobility of spirit",Aristotle moves on to justice. Like nobility of spirit, justice is a virtue, and therefore a happy medium between two extremes. As Aristotle writes, “the just is that which is lawful and just, and the unjust is that which is unlawful and unjust,” and thus the just man takes neither too much nor too little of his share (112). ). In this sense, the just man is also worthy of choice, because his actions prove virtuous. In fact, as Aristotle argues, “justice is considered the highest of all virtues and, as the proverb says, ‘in justice all virtue is summed up’” (114). At first glance, immediate connections can be made between nobility of spirit, from which Aristotle constructed justice, and justice, both of which are the umbrella of the other virtues. This parallel does not last long, however, because Aristotle distinguishes justice as "complete virtue", "because he who possesses it can make use of his virtue not only by himself, but also in his relations with his fellow men" (114 ). Thus, while nobility of spirit allowed the individual to know what he deserved, justice allows the individual to know what others, including himself, deserve. Justice then draws on the skills of noble people and applies it at the community level in interpersonal relationships. Aristotle then offsets his characterization of complete justice with what he calls partial justice, a term that begins to consider questions of equality and fairness in what he calls partial justice. is “right”. The theme of equality, however, was first brought up in his discussion of noble individuals, who were luckier than petty and vain individuals. That is to say, “gifts of fortune, it is believed, also contribute to nobility of spirit” since “men of noble birth, power or wealth are considered worthy of honor” (96 ). Aristotle therefore considers this reality of inequality in what he calls “merit” as he begins his discussion of partial justice. Partial justice itself has two forms: one being "what is just, in the distribution of honors", among other things, and the other being what is just in "a rectifying function", and each adopts a unique position on equality and fairness (117).Aristotle first discusses distributive justice, which arises from a characterization of justice as being both just and equal. Here, Aristotle's argument follows the reality of nobility of spirit, according to which not everyone possesses the same merit, and therefore in receiving what each deserves, the distribution of honor, material goods and of “whatever can be shared among those who have a share in the political system” should be done in proportion to their merits (117). Thus, as Aristotle writes: “If people are not equal, their (just) shares will not be equal” and “consequently, the just is something proportionate” (118, 119). There is, however, equality in the sense that “proportion is equality of proportions,” and so justice in this sense dictates that equality be applied only in proportions whose proportions are unequal (119). on the other hand, it applies a new sense of equality, seeking to maintain the status quo, or balance, through the transactions carried out by citizens. While the just in the distributive sense sought to distribute common funds according to “geometric” proportions, as Aristotle says, the just in the rectifying sense seeks to carry out transactions according to “arithmetic” proportions. Here, justice then takes the form of a sort of blind justice, “it treats the parties on an equal footing and only asks whether one has committed a wrong and whether the other has suffered a wrong” ( 121).Such justice is ultimately meted out by a judge, who seeks to restore balance by locating the median between gain and loss in the conflict, without considering the merits of the parties involved. Aristotle ends his discussion of justice by returning to its meaning in a broader sense. , and particularly how we find it in political matters. As Aristotle writes: “The just in political matters is found among men who share a common life so that their association brings them self-sufficiency, and who are free and equal, either proportionally or arithmetically” (129). From there, Aristotle can then build a friendship, which will necessarily involve virtues such as nobility of spirit, but again on a communal level. As Aristotle argues, “justice, alone of all the virtues, is considered the good of others, because it is a relation to our fellows insofar as it does what benefits others” (114). In this sense, just as justice is based on nobility of spirit, so friendship, which, according to Aristotle, is the golden mean between obsequiousness and flattery, is built. Friendship nevertheless shares similarities with nobility of spirit, the crown of virtues, as it exists in its best form between similar or similar individuals. Thus, according to Aristotle, a noble man will “utterly despise the honors conferred.” by ordinary people and for insignificant reasons, because it is not what he deserves” (95). Likewise, friendships are not disposed to like associations, because they are also less rewarding in associations of unequals. Aristotle therefore declares that “The perfect form of friendship is that between good men, similar in excellence and virtue” (219). Friendship then plays an important role in community relations. This beneficial role is the result of the mutual attention that friends give to each other when, as Aristotle writes, a friend “will bear, and also refuse to bear, good things in the right way” (103). Likewise, “friends help young men avoid error; to the elderly, they provide the care and assistance necessary to make up for the failing capacities for action that infirmity causes; and to those who are in the prime of life they give the opportunity to perform noble deeds” (215). The friends then essentially provide those who are not noble with the guidance needed to choose good actions and live virtuously. Of course, the genuine friendships described above are already most often between individuals of good virtue, but considering friendship in terms of the capabilities of those of noble spirit shows the thread that connects virtue at the individual level to the virtue that exists at the community level. level, or when it comes to justice and friendship. It is also helpful to think of friendship here as the accumulation of a second self, or soul. In other words, since the soul is the origin of the contemplative life of reason and reasoning, as well as the origin of choice making, a friend is the soul or complement of the self because it also fulfills these functions . Aristotle also speaks of friendship in terms of equality. As Aristotle sums it up: “Friendship is equality and resemblance, and especially the resemblance of those who are similar in virtue” (230). But just as equality takes on varied meanings in matters of justice, it is the same in matters of friendship where it can exist in a quantitative (rectificative) and proportional (distributive) sense. To illustrate this difference, Aristotle first discusses friendships between equals and between unequals. After discussing equals, Aristotle concludes: “In summary, the friendships we have discussed so far are based on equality; both partners receive.