Hilary Putnam. The thesis states that different physical properties can implement the same mental property. This argument has evolved from Putnam's initial aim of rejecting type identity theory and many philosophers have redefined the implications of multiple realizability. There are two philosophers in the philosophy of mind who are famous for their work exploring multiple realizability and the implications of this thesis for science, or more specifically psychology. Jaegwon Kim and Jerry Fodor both attempt multiple realizability, but neither of them will reach the same conclusion. This essay will discuss Kim and Fodor's views on multiple realizability and how it can affect the way we view psychology. I will first explain Kim's response to multiple realizability in his 1992 article "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction." This article was written in response to Fodor's article on multiple realizability and functionalism. Kim believes that if we defend a thesis such as multiple realizability, we will be unable to consider psychology a science. This article will focus specifically on Kim's jade analogy. I will then explain why I believe that Fodor's response in "Special Sciences" reveals that Kim's jade analogy is an error and false references. Multiple realizability is the thesis that different physical properties can produce the same mental property. The theory was originally constructed by Hilary Putnam to combat the type identity theorist who claimed that "pain is the same as C-fiber firing." (Wikipedia) Putnam sought to explain how it could be that humans, with their distinct neuroanatomy, seem to experience the same pain that a dog or cat might experience. How is it that a dog can feel the middle of a paper......b, and so on, and if that can't be the case, pain follows a set of natural laws because from its infinite set of neuro-physical types, it would then follow that psychology is not part of the sciences. In light of Kim's jade/pain analogy, he responds thus, supporting its consequences of multiple realizability: "there are no scientific theories about jade, we don't need them." (Kim 16) In 1997, Jerry Fodor wrote an essay to express his continued belief in the multiple realizability and existence of psychology as a self-contained science, not only locally but globally. His essay is a response to Kim's 1992 article, and in this essay I will focus specifically on his response to Kim's jade analogy, and why he believes that jade and pain are not the same natural kind structure, and therefore not subject to disjunctions and the problems that arise from them.