American doctrine focuses its COIN methods on the ability to help a host country strengthen its political legitimacy and credibility. Establishing political legitimacy is the foundation of the COIN strategy which allows governments to build relationships with local leaders and gain support from their communities while simultaneously eliminating an insurgency. The doctrine is subjective rather than prescriptive; however, failure to follow fundamental principles leads to many contradictions on how to achieve specific goals. Evidence from the COIN campaigns in Vietnam and Afghanistan showed a faulty implementation of fundamental principles of American counterinsurgency. These principles include the ability to establish sound political strategy and security, all with a host nation in the driver's seat. Although these two wars have many differences, they are similar in some ways. Specifically, how the United States failed to follow basic COIN practices and how to leverage lessons learned is paramount to U.S. strategic initiatives. governed. How can we build a successful COIN campaign by supporting weak surrogate leadership, as the United States did in Vietnam and Afghanistan? Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam and Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan are both examples of failed leadership supported by the United States in their attempt to influence political reform. The United States based its support for Diem on his religious background, his anti-communist stance, and, most importantly, his relationship with American officials. U.S. officials also favored Karzai, who shared an interest in extraditing the Taliban insurgent regime. Unfortunately, these leaders were reluctant to reform the democratic institution that the West had adopted.